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Fact-finding Without Facts
(Tremendous thanks to IntLawGrrls for inviting me to contribute this guest post)
The international criminal tribunals confront severe
impediments to accurate fact-finding.
The challenge of that fact-finding process is the subject of my
book, Fact-finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary
Foundations of International Criminal Convictions, published
just days ago by Cambridge University Press. The book is
summarized in an article I contributed to a 2009 symposium
edition.
The basis for my study is a large-scale review of transcripts
from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, theSpecial
Court for Sierra Leone, and the Special Panels for East
Timor (below left). (photo credit) This review demonstrates that
many international witnesses are unable to convey the
information that court personnel expect – and need – to receive if they are to make
reasoned factual assessments in which we can have confidence.
Moreover, what clear information witnesses do provide in court often conflicts with the
information that the witnesses previously provided in their pre-trial statements. I find that:
► Such inconsistencies pervade international criminal testimony; and
► They frequently pertain to core features of that testimony.
In particular, my review of all of the completed Sierra Leone Special Court cases and a
handful of the Rwanda Tribunal cases shows thatmore than 50 percent of the
prosecution witnesses appearing in these trials testified in a way that was seriously
inconsistent with their pre-trial statements. Sometimes the inconsistencies related to
such details as the date, time, or place of the crime, but as frequently they related to
such fundamental matters as the nature of the crime and the nature of the defendant’s
involvement in the crime.
After delineating these testimonial deficiencies, I consider some of their causes:
► Limitations on witness capacity: Many witnesses lack the education and life
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experiences to be able to read maps, tell time, or
answer questions concerningdistances and
dates. Cultural norms and
taboos create additional
communication difficulties,
as some witnesses are
reluctant to speak directly or
at all about certain events
and as international judges inappropriately
assess witnesses’ demeanor and willingness to
answer questions by Western norms. The need for language interpretation for virtually
every fact witness and the unfamiliarity of most witnesses with the predominantly
adversarial trial procedures used at the international tribunals only compound these
problems.
► Witness mendacity: Educational, cultural, and linguistic factors likely cause many of
the inconsistencies and other testimonial deficiencies that pervade international trials,
but witness mendacity provides an equally plausible explanation. Indeed, my review of
ICTR cases shows that more than 90 percent of cases that went to trial featured
an alibior another example of diametrically opposing testimony from
defense and prosecution witnesses. Although some of these
witnesses may be honestly mistaken, the use of alibis and the
incidence of contradictory testimony so vastly exceeds that which
is common to domestic trials that it would be naïve to dismiss a
substantial portion of it as arising from honest mistakes.
These empirical findings lead me to conclude that international
criminal trials are less reliable adjudicatory mechanisms than they appear.
But, the fact that international tribunals have considerable difficulty determining who did
what to whom does not necessarily call into question the legal accuracy of international
criminal judgments. What matters for that question is the way in which the Trial
Chambers respond to the testimonial deficiencies that pervade their trials.
Comparison between witness testimony and the Trial Chambers’ description and
treatment of that testimony led to the discovery that, as a general matter, the tribunals
take something of a cavalier approach to fact-finding impediments. Many testimonial
deficiencies are never mentioned in the Trial Chambers’ judgments, and most of those
that are, are reflexively attributed to innocent causes that do not impact the witnesses’
credibility.
So, why do the Trial Chambers seem so unconcerned about testimonial deficiencies?
In my view, the Trial Chambers’ cavalier attitude derives most directly from principles of
organizational liability that appeared in Article 9 of the 1945 Charter of the
InternationalMilitary Tribunal at Nuremberg. These organizational liability principles
were ostensibly discredited during the Nuremberg
Trial (right), but they continue to exert a powerful
influence over fact-finding at today’s international
tribunals.
Indeed, if the Trial Chambers appear largely
unconcerned about testimonial deficiencies, it
may be because the testimony itself is not the
exclusive basis for the Trial Chambers’ factual
determinations.
The Trial Chambers appear to be convicting
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defendants on the basis of the acts charged in the indictments and basing their factual
findings about those acts solely on the testimony that has been presented to them. In
fact, however, the Trial Chambers supplement that testimony with inferences that they
draw from the defendants’ official position or institutional affiliation in the context of the
international crimes that have been committed.
Careful examination shows:
► Why the inferences drawn from the position or affiliation of the accused can prove
particularly compelling; and
► How such inferences can explain and justify both:
►► The Trial Chambers’ casual treatment of most fact-finding impediments; and
►► Certain otherwise inexplicable acquittals.
In short, because objective or reliable evidence is so difficult to come by in the
international realm, Trial Chambers rely on official position or institutional affiliation as a
proxy of sorts for the defendant’s involvement in the crimes.
Prosecutors must still present some evidence to support the specific allegations
appearing in the indictment. The stronger the inferences that can reasonably be drawn
from official position, however, the more that Trial Chambers are willing to overlook
problematic features of prosecution witness testimony or attribute those problems to
innocent causes.
After proposing methods for improving the quality of international tribunal testimony, in
my book’s final chapter I consider the broadest and most pressing normative question:
Will the fact-finding impediments, if they persist, fatally undermine the
work of the international tribunals?
Various ways of justifying international criminal fact-finding are addressed. The primary
focus, though, is on how the evidence presented at the international tribunals interacts
with the applicable standard of proof. Particularly explored are modern scholars who
viewbeyond a reasonable doubt as variable standard that signifies -- and should signify--
different levels of certainty in different cases. I conclude that this understanding of the
standard of proof not only affords an alternative explanation for international criminal fact-
finding, but also provides a solid and satisfying justification for it.
